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By PAUL J. RIEHLE,* MICHAEL L. FOX,** & CHRISTOPHER K. ZAND***
Introduction
WHETHER A MANUFACTURER bears liability for hazards associ-
ated with third-party replacement or connected parts remains a
fiercely debated and unsettled issue in products liability litigation.
The issue often arises in asbestos personal injury cases, where plain-
tiffs seek to impose liability on equipment manufacturers who had lit-
tle or nothing to do with the distribution of asbestos-containing
replacement parts or associated equipment. Despite their limited in-
volvement in distribution, these third-party manufacturers are seeing
an increasing number of claims given the insolvency of other parties.
Several jurisdictions are beginning to address the issue and draw
bright-line rules in the sand. How this issue is decided will likely affect
the number of filings of asbestos injury and other products liability
cases, as well as the manner in which the cases are litigated.
This Article will (1) examine the development of tort law as it
applies to the compensation of victims of asbestos exposure, (2) sur-
vey the current landscape regarding the novel products liability claims
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brought against manufacturers for hazards associated with replace-
ment or associated parts, as well as discuss how courts have wrestled
with this issue, and (3) draw upon recent decisions from Washington
and California to advocate a bright-line rule that limits liability to
those third-party manufacturers in a harmful product’s chain of
distribution.
I. Historical Perspective
A. Asbestos and Its Uses
Asbestos, a word derived from a Greek adjective meaning inde-
structible or inextinguishable, is a naturally occurring silicate mineral
with thin fibrous crystals.1 Since ancient times, humans have used as-
bestos in their daily lives. The ancient Greeks wove asbestos into their
cloth, the early Romans included asbestos in lamp wicks, and during
the Middle Ages asbestos was used to insulate suits of armor.2
The popularity of asbestos grew in the late nineteenth century
due in large part to its favorable industrial qualities, abundance, and
relatively inexpensive mining and processing costs. Heralded by man-
ufacturers and builders because of its strong, durable, and fire-retard-
ant capability, asbestos became widely used in industrial and
residential settings.3
The industrial revolution and World Wars of the twentieth cen-
tury further fueled the demand for asbestos; more than 3000 prod-
ucts—including textiles, building materials, insulation, and brake
linings—utilized what became known as a wonder product. World
War II catapulted the United States Navy into shipbuilding efforts of
unprecedented proportions.4 Asbestos was the ideal material to insu-
late the heat-producing components in naval vessels’ due to its ability
to withstand high temperatures and corrosion and its relative abun-
dance in nature.5 The Navy used thousands of metric tons of asbestos
to create thermal insulation that wrapped the pipes and lined the boil-
1. MERRIAM-WEBSTER COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 71 (11th ed. 2003), http://www.mer-
riam-webster.com/dictionary/asbestos (defining asbestos); “Asbestos,” AGENCY FOR TOXIC
SUBSTANCES AND DISEASE REGISTRY, http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/substances/toxsubstance.asp
?toxid=4 (last visited Aug. 29, 2009).
2. James E. Alleman & Brooke T. Mossman, Asbestos Revisited, SCI. AM., July 1997, at
70–71.
3. Id. at 70–75.
4. The American fleet grew from 394 vessels in 1939 to 6768 in 1945, with more than
four million men and women called to build and repair that vast fleet. See Bill Burke,
Shipyards, a Crucible for Tragedy, THE VIRGINIAN-PILOT, May 6, 2001, at A1.
5. See id.
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ers, engines, and turbines of the ships.6 In addition to thermal insula-
tion, the Navy also used asbestos as a reinforcing agent in insulating
mud, asbestos millboard, gaskets, and many other specialty products.
Reports of health hazards associated with asbestos began to
emerge in the United States in the early 1930s. In the 1960s and
1970s, groundbreaking scientific research led by Dr. Irving Selikoff at
Mount Sinai School of Medicine revealed the associations between as-
bestos and illness.7 Doctors began to attribute the increase in respira-
tory diseases to asbestos exposures, and the United States government
began implementing sweeping asbestos regulations in the 1970s
through the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) and the Occu-
pational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”).8 These stan-
dards have steadily become stricter over the last thirty years.9
However, despite the efforts of government and industry to limit ex-
posures and reduce the risk of illness, the number of deaths attributed
to asbestos has remained constant due to the typical twenty- to forty-
year latency period between exposure to asbestos and the onset of an
asbestos-related disease.10 Some reports estimate that approximately
230,000 asbestos-related deaths will have occurred between 1985 and
2009.11
B. Waves of Asbestos-Related Personal Injury Claims
Asbestos-related personal injury litigation against asbestos manu-
facturers and suppliers began in the late 1960s. Johns-Manville and
Owens Corning were among the first defendants subjected to waves of
asbestos-related personal injury claims. Formed in 1901 as a pipe cov-
6. See id.
7. STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL., ASBESTOS LITIGATION 12 (RAND Inst. for Civ. Just.
2005) available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_MG162.pdf;
Alan Calnan & Byron G. Stier, Perspectives on Asbestos Litigation: Overview and Preview, 37 SW.
U. L. REV. 459, 460 (2008).
8. See CARROLL ET AL., supra note 7, at 12. R
9. For example, in 1971, the first permissible exposure limit (“PEL”) for asbestos
under OSHA rules was 12 fibers (of asbestos) per cubic centimeter (“f/cc”) within an
eight-hour period. Later that year, the PEL was reduced to 5 f/cc, and by 1986, it was
reduced to 0.2 f/cc. In 1986, the construction industry standard added specific provisions
to cover the increasingly prevalent hazards relating to asbestos abatement and demolition
jobs. Today, the PEL under both OSHA and the EPA is 0.1 f/cc for asbestos work in all
industries, including construction, shipyards, and asbestos abatement. See Marc Alan
Lappe´, Principles of Occupational Toxicology, in OCCUPATIONAL MEDICINE SECRETS 15–20
(Rosemarie M. Bowler & James E. Cone eds., 1999).
10. John Crane, Inc. v. Scribner, 800 A.2d 727, 730–36, 740 n.4 (Md. Ct. App. 2002);
Calnan & Stier, supra note 7, at 461 n.12. R
11. Calnan & Stier, supra note 7, at 461. R
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ering and insulation company, Johns-Manville became one of the larg-
est asbestos manufacturers in the world, offering more than 200
asbestos products and applications, and eventually became the face of
asbestos litigation.12 Owens Corning likewise enjoyed immense suc-
cess selling asbestos-containing pipe insulation and fireproofing
agents.13
The first modern-day asbestos-related personal injury case was
brought in 1967 by Claude Tomplait of Beaumont, Texas, against
eleven manufacturers of asbestos-containing insulation products, in-
cluding Johns-Manville and Owens Corning.14 Tomplait alleged in his
complaint that the defendants either knew, or should have known, of
the health hazards associated with asbestos.15 Tomplait claimed that
defendants’ liability was based on a failure to warn of these hazards.16
The case proceeded to trial on May 12, 1969.17 Of the eleven defend-
ants, five were ultimately dropped from the suit, five settled, and the
jury found in favor of the remaining defendant.
Clarence Borel, a co-worker of Tomplait, also suffered from an
asbestos-related disease and brought suit against multiple asbestos
manufacturers.18 Borel sought to hold the defendants liable for the
following acts of negligence: (1) failing to take reasonable precautions
or to take reasonable care to warn Borel of the danger to which he was
exposed as a worker when using the defendants’ insulation products;
(2) failing to inform Borel as to what would be safe and sufficient
apparel, protective equipment, or methods of handing and using the
insulation products; (3) failing to test the asbestos products in order
to ascertain the dangers involved in their use; and (4) failing to re-
move the products from the market upon learning they could cause
asbestos-related disease.19 Borel also contended that the defendants’
12. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Bailey, 129 S. Ct. 2195 (2009); JOHNS MANSVILLE, JOHNS
MANVILLE 150 YEAR COMMEMORATION PUBLICATION, http://www.jm.com/marketing/jm
150/pdf/JM150thCommemorativePublication-English.pdf (last visited Aug. 29, 2009).
13. Owens Corning, Financial Reorganization, Asbestos Chronology, http://www.owens
corning.com/finre/asbestos.html (last visited Aug. 29, 2009).
14. D. ALAN RUDLIN, TOXIC TORT LITIGATION 352–53 (2007); Scott Sabatini, Beyond the
Rhetoric: The Impact of Asbestos Litigation, THE SOUTHEAST TEXAS RECORD, Nov. 17, 2008,
http://www.setexasrecord.com/news/215936-beyond-the-rhetoric-the-impact-of-asbestos-
litigation.
15. RUDLIN, supra note 14, at 352–53; Bill Mulligan, Mesothelioma Litigation, ASBESTOS
NET, Apr. 29, 2009, http://www.asbestos.net/asbestos-legal-issues/mesothelioma-litigation.
html.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1086 (5th Cir. 1973).
19. Id.
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insulation products were unreasonably dangerous and defective be-
cause the products lacked adequate warnings of the foreseeable dan-
gers.20 Unlike Tomplait’s case, the jury returned a verdict for Borel
based on strict liability, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed.21 In its opinion,
the Court of Appeals confirmed the application of the theory of strict
liability set forth in section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts22 and further clarified that where an unavoidably unsafe prod-
uct such as asbestos-containing insulation is not capable of being safe
for its ordinary and intended use, the failure to give adequate warn-
ings renders the product unreasonably dangerous or defective.23
The Fifth Circuit’s decision in Borel paved the way for other asbes-
tos victims to initiate similar legal battles in other parts of the United
States. As of 2002, approximately 730,000 individuals have filed asbes-
tos suits, and many more are expected thereafter.24
C. Bankruptcies, the Search for New Defendants, and the
Expansion of Tort Law to Compensate Victims
The onslaught of asbestos personal injury claims led the principal
asbestos manufacturer and supplier, Johns-Manville, to file for Chap-
ter 11 bankruptcy in 1982.25 In 1988, the insolvent company formed
the Manville Trust to pay asbestos claims. However, a resulting rush of
initial claims on the trust forced a reorganization. The trust now pays
claims on a sliding scale, much less than jury awards and only a frac-
tion of amounts originally awarded in the 1980s. In the wake of the
Johns-Manville bankruptcy, dozens of other manufacturers have filed
20. Id. at 1088.
21. Id. at 1081.
22. Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts states: “One who sells any
product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer . . . is
subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer.”
Section 402A grew out of two California Supreme Court decisions. Greenman v. Yuba Power
Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963), held that “[a] manufacturer is strictly liable in tort
when an article he places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection
for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being.” Id. at 900. Simi-
larly, Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 391 P.2d 168 (Cal. 1964), held that retailers, like manu-
facturers, are engaged in the business of distributing goods to the public, and that they are
an integral part of the overall producing and marketing enterprise that should bear the
cost of injuries resulting from defective products. Id. at 171.
23. Borel, 493 F.2d at 1088–89.
24. Calnan & Stier, supra note 7, at 462. R
25. Mark D. Plevin & Paul W. Kalish, Where Are They Now? A History of the Companies
That Have Sought Bankruptcy Production Due to Asbestos Claims, in MEALEY’S ASBESTOS BANKR.
REP., Aug. 2001, at 1–2; Johns-Manville, Company History (2009), http://www.jm.com/
corporate/56.htm.
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bankruptcies and created trusts.26 Today, most of the former asbestos
industry manufacturers and suppliers are bankrupt, and companies
that never made asbestos are being named as defendants in asbestos
litigation.
Unable to collect against insolvent manufacturers, asbestos per-
sonal injury attorneys began searching for alternative and ancillary
sources of recovery.27 Not content with the remedies available
through bankruptcy trusts and state and federal worker compensation
programs, claimants’ lawyers have extended the reach of products lia-
bility law to “ever-more peripheral defendants”28 who used asbestos-
containing materials on their premises or contemplated the use of
asbestos-containing parts in connection with their products.29 One
plaintiff’s attorney candidly described asbestos litigation as an “endless
search for a solvent bystander.”30 Indeed, the litigation has ensnared
as defendants at least 8400 entities across seventy-five industries.31
These new classes of defendants contributed very little to the as-
bestos crisis, and they have a minimal connection to the now defunct
industry that mined, milled, processed, and sold asbestos products to
the public. As a result, litigants and the courts continue to struggle to
apply tort law theories in assigning legal and financial responsibility
for injuries to asbestos victims.32 Whether rooted in negligence or
strict liability, plaintiffs have asserted that any foreseeable use of asbes-
tos imposes duties upon manufacturers to warn against and/or take
measures to prevent resulting harm, and that their failure to satisfy
these duties renders the otherwise safe products defective. While a
vast body of tort law provides some appeal for the applicability of
these theories, many defenses and policy reasons negate any obliga-
tion to warn against exposure to asbestos added or caused by others
during post-sale use. The varying tests and results underscore the
need for a bright-line rule that will restore fairness, predictability, and
appropriate deterrence to the tort system.
26. Plevin & Kalish, supra note 25, at 2–3. R
27. Calnan & Stier, supra note 7, at 463. R
28. Id.
29. Keith N. Hylton, Asbestos and Mass Torts with Fraudulent Victims, 37 SW. U. L. REV.
575, 592 (2008) (“[T]he remaining defendants today involve conduct that may have been
negligent at worst.”).
30. “Medical Monitoring and Asbestos Litigation”—A Discussion with Richard Scruggs and
Victor Schwartz, in MEALEY’S LIT. REP.: ASBESTOS, Mar. 1, 2002, at 5 (quoting Mr. Scruggs).
31. Calnan & Stier, supra note 7, at 462. R
32. Id.; James A. Henderson, Jr., Sellers of Safe Products Should Not Be Required to Rescue
Users from Risks Presented by Other, More Dangerous Products, 37 SW. U. L. REV. 595 (2008).
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II. Drawing an Appropriate Standard for Liability for
Replacement and Affixed Parts
As tort law evolves and the efforts to impose liability for asbestos
exposure on ever more remote parties increase, courts must develop
standards to better assess and impose liability on those parties who
bear responsibility for causing injury. Manufacturers and distributors
of an array of products face claims based on strict liability and negli-
gence theories that seek to extend responsibility for mere use of the
products and impose liability for failure to warn of harm caused by the
“foreseeable use.”33 But virtually any product can be deemed “defec-
tive,” and its manufacturer deemed responsible, if a “foreseeable use”
causes harm. Therefore, courts have developed limitations and have
refused to extend liability for harm caused by components or affixed
products outside the manufacturers’ control.34 These courts have re-
lied on principles of products liability which state that only those in
the marketing chain should bear the risk of harm, as they alone have
the ability to spread the risk and expense among users.35 However,
consistent bright-line standards for liability have not emerged, and
clearer rules are needed.
A. Imposing Liability Based on Foreseeability and Failure to Warn
Many courts have held that a product can be considered harmful
and can give rise to a duty to warn when used with a third-party prod-
uct that creates a dangerous condition. For example, Teagle v.
Fischer & Porter Co.36 involved a strict liability suit for failure to warn of
potential hazards resulting from the use of a metal and glass flowrator
to measure ammonia.37 The flowrator required third-party manufac-
tured O-rings to seal the open ends of the glass tube component.38 In
33. See, e.g., Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 810 P.2d 549, 553 (Cal.
1991) (holding that any product is defective in design when it fails to perform “as safely as
an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended and reasonably foreseeable
manner”). In Anderson, the California Supreme Court commented on prior opinions that
recognized “a failure to give adequate warnings might subject a manufacturer or distribu-
tor to strict liability when [the manufacturer] knew or should have known of the danger and
the necessity of warnings to ensure safe use.” Id. at 554. Although the cases cited in Ander-
son did not directly discuss the manufacturer’s knowledge as a separate element of strict
liability, the court nevertheless explained that “a knowledge or knowability component
clearly was included as an implicit condition of strict liability.” Id.
34. DeLeon v. Commercial Mfg. & Supply Co., 195 Cal. Rptr. 867 (Ct. App. 1983).
35. Id.
36. 570 P.2d 438 (Wash. 1997).
37. Id. at 441.
38. Id.
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particular, the manufacturer knew that Viton brand O-rings would
harden and disintegrate when used with ammonia and thus would sig-
nificantly increase the likelihood that the flowrator could explode.
Despite this knowledge, defendant Fischer & Porter did not warn pur-
chasers of the potential danger from using Viton O-rings and only
recommended the use of Buna brand O-rings, which did not have the
same harmful reaction when used with ammonia.39 The Supreme
Court of Washington found the defendant’s solution inadequate and
held that the defendant’s lack of warning of the dangers associated
with using Viton brand O-rings with ammonia rendered the flowrator
itself unsafe,40 and that the defendant manufacturer was not absolved
of its duty to warn customers who used ammonia that Viton brand O-
rings should not be used with the flowrator.41 Therefore, the Teagle
court found that the manufacturer’s mere use of a third-party product
in its product could give rise to a duty to warn.
The Fifth Circuit encountered a similar situation in Stapleton v.
Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Ltd.42 where the normal use of a product
that incorporated a third-party product caused injury. In that case, a
motorcycle was tipped over while its fuel switch was in the “on” posi-
tion. Gasoline leaked out of the engine and ignited on a nearby pilot
light. In Stapleton, the jury found no design defect with the motorcy-
cle, but still concluded that Kawasaki breached its duty to warn about
the danger of gasoline leakage when the fuel switch was in the “on”
position.43 The Fifth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the defendant
should have made greater efforts to warn users of the potential danger
from failing to turn the fuel switch to the “off” position and that such
a failure to warn was sufficient to hold the defendant liable under
both negligence and strict liability theories. The court also clarified
that, while the motorcycle itself was not dangerous, its design required
the use of a hazardous substance—gasoline—during normal use, and
that design condition required the defendant to warn about the
hazards of gasoline leakage despite the fact the company did not man-
ufacture or supply the gasoline.44
The “foreseeable use” argument draws support from DeLeon v.
Commercial Manufacturing & Supply Co.,45 which held that a manufac-
39. Id.
40. Id. at 442.
41. Id.
42. 608 F.2d 571 (5th Cir. 1979).
43. Id. at 572.
44. Id. at 572–73.
45. 195 Cal. Rptr. 867 (Ct. App. 1983).
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turer has a duty to warn of hazards arising from the foreseeable uses
of its product even if the hazards arise from the addition of a product
which, although manufactured by another, is used in the normal op-
eration of the defendant’s product.46 In DeLeon, defendant Commer-
cial manufactured a sorting bin for use on the plaintiff’s employer’s
conveyer belt line in close proximity to an overhead line shaft manu-
factured by another.47 The overhead line shaft “ha[d] nothing to do
with the operation of the bin” and was not manufactured by the de-
fendant.48 Cleaning the bin, however, put the plaintiff in danger of
being injured by the overhead line shaft. The trial court granted a
summary judgment in favor of Commercial on the theory that the
manufacturer was not responsible for choosing the location of the
equipment in the fruit processing line; therefore, the lower court con-
cluded that the equipment had no inherent defect and could not
have been the cause of the plaintiff-employee’s injury. The appellate
court reversed and found that Commercial, as the bin manufacturer,
could have foreseen this danger and therefore had a duty to warn.49
In reversing summary judgment, the California Court of Appeal
found that even though there was a safe way to clean the bin, “the
important factor is whether it is foreseeable that someone would
climb onto the belt [for cleaning] . . . .”50 The court further explained
that “Commercial did not show that such an act was unforeseeable, so
even if plaintiff’s acts constituted misuse of the product, if her acts
were foreseeable, Commercial is not absolved of blame.”51 The appel-
late court emphasized that a product must not be viewed in isolation,
but must take into account the reality of the circumstances in which
the product operates.52 Thus, the Court of Appeal extended liability
to also encompass instances of foreseeable misuse.
The Alabama Supreme Court confronted the issue of whether a
manufacturer remains liable for foreseeable uses of their product in
Hannah v. Gregg, Bland & Berry, Inc.53 Hannah involved the widow of a
worker who was crushed to death between two large industrial ma-
46. Id. at 872.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 870.
49. Id. at 875–76.
50. Id. at 872.
51. Id.
52. Id. (citing Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 501 P.2d 1153, 1157 (Cal. 1972) (“The
design and manufacture of products should not be carried out in an industrial vacuum but
with recognition of the realities of their everyday use.”)).
53. 840 So. 2d 839 (Ala. 2002).
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chines, known as a “belt wrapper” and a “recoiler.”54 Plaintiff brought
a wrongful-death action alleging negligence against the company that
reconfigured the belt wrapper and the supplier of electrical compo-
nents on the plant line.55 The belt wrapper was originally configured
to operate in an overwind direction, but it was modified a few decades
later to operate in an underwind direction.56 The new specifications
did not include barriers to protect persons working between the belt
wrapper and the recoiler.57 While inspecting the belt wrapper and the
recoiler, the plaintiff’s husband became trapped and was crushed be-
tween the machines.58 During the accident, machine controllers at-
tempted to shut down the belt wrapper and recoiler, but the systems
did not respond.59 The supplier of the electrical components argued
that it could not be held liable for alleged defects in the control
panels because the panels underwent substantial modification follow-
ing installation by the company that reconfigured the belt wrapper.60
The trial court agreed, and granted a summary judgment motion in
favor of the company.61 The Alabama Supreme Court reversed the
trial court’s decision, holding that a manufacturer or seller remains
liable “if the alteration or modification was reasonably foreseeable to
the manufacturer or seller.”62
The holding in Tellez-Cordova v. Campbell-Hausfeld/Scott Fetzger
Co.63 likewise supports claims that a manufacturer is liable for the dan-
ger of injury caused by products of another when it is foreseeable that
such products will be used in connection with the sole intended pur-
pose of the defendant’s product.64 In Tellez-Cordova, the court held a
manufacturer of grinders liable for failing to warn of injuries caused
by the disintegration and release of respirable toxins from third-party
discs used with the grinders.65 The court rejected the grinder manu-
facturer’s argument that it was shielded by a bright-line rule that pre-
vented any manufacturer from liability for “defects in a final product
54. Id. at 844.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 845.
58. Id. at 845–46.
59. Id. at 846.
60. Id. at 854.
61. Id. at 846.
62. Id. at 855.
63. 28 Cal. Rptr. 3d 744 (Ct. App. 2004).
64. Id. at 748.
65. Id. at 747.
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over which they had no control.”66 Rather, the court found that defen-
dant was not “asked to warn of defects in a final product over which
they had no control, but of defects which occur when their products
are used as intended . . . .”67
Similarly in Gonzales v. Carmenita Ford Truck Sales, Inc.,68 the court
reversed a defense judgment where the trial court failed to instruct
the jury that the defendant truck manufacturer could be liable for
failing to warn with respect to the hazards arising in brake repairs and
maintenance.69 The court held that “the warning requirement is not
limited to unreasonably or unavoidably dangerous products. Rather,
directions or warnings are in order where reasonably required to pre-
vent the use of a product from becoming unreasonably dangerous.”70
Likewise, in Davis v. Pak-Mor Manufacturing Co.,71 the court fo-
cused on the issue of foreseeability. In that case, a widow of a garbage
collector filed a wrongful death action against a manufacturer of the
truck cab and chassis, a manufacturer of the packing device used to
convert the truck into a garbage truck, and the seller/installer of the
device.72 The plaintiff’s deceased husband had been operating a gar-
bage-packing device located at the rear of his truck when the truck
began to move.73 As he ran to the front of the truck and attempted to
enter the cab, he fell.74 The truck ran over him and caused fatal inju-
ries.75 Neither party disputed that the switch wiring of the truck had
been altered to permit the operation of the packing device with the
truck in gear.76 Plaintiff argued that the garbage truck and the pack-
ing control switch constituted an unreasonably dangerous product,
and that the defendants had a duty to guard against the alteration of
the switch wiring.77 The defendant packing manufacturer moved for
summary judgment, arguing it could not have foreseen the alteration
of the switch wiring enabling the device to operate while the truck was
in gear.78 The truck cab and chassis manufacturer also moved for sum-
66. Id. at 748.
67. Id.
68. 238 Cal. Rptr. 18 (Ct. App. 1987).
69. Id. at 20–21.
70. Id. at 23.
71. 672 N.E.2d 771 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996).
72. Id. at 773.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 775.
78. Id.
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mary judgment on the grounds that the alleged dangerous condition
involved systems incorporated onto the cab and chassis after they left
the manufacturer’s control.79 The trial court granted summary judg-
ment for all three defendants and plaintiff appealed.80
The Illinois Appellate Court ruled that “[w]here an unreasonably
dangerous condition is caused by a modification to the product after
it leaves the manufacturer’s control, the manufacturer is not liable
unless the modification was reasonably foreseeable.”81 The appellate
court also placed emphasis on the notion that, if a product is capable
of easily being modified by its operator, and if the operator has a
known incentive to effect the modification, then it is objectively rea-
sonable for a manufacturer to anticipate the modification.82 Based on
the above rationale, the court reversed and found that a material issue
of fact existed as to whether the defendants could foresee that a gar-
bage truck operator could easily rewire the packing control switch in
order to pack on the run.83 The appellate court noted it was unable to
identify any evidence indicating the rewiring of the switch was a com-
plex procedure or that an average garbage truck operator would not
have the knowledge necessary to accomplish the modification.84
Iowa courts addressed this issue in Leaf v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co.,85 where a worker injured by a tire rupture sued the tire manufac-
turer for personal injuries based on strict liability. The plaintiff, an
employee of a tire re-treading shop, sustained injuries when he at-
tempted to install a newly re-treaded tire.86 Under normal circum-
stances, he would have inflated the tire in a safety cage, but he was
unable to do so because the bead on the re-treaded tire would not seal
on the rim.87 In order to inflate the tire, the plaintiff needed to use a
“bead blaster,” a device that forces a rush of air between the tire and
rim, causing the tire to expand and seal against the rim.88 Unable to
use a bead blaster while the tire was in a safety cage, the plaintiff at-
tempted to follow the accepted industry practice of partially inflating
79. Id. at 773, 775.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 775 (citing Woods v. Graham Eng’g Corp., 539 N.E.2d 316, 318 (Ill. App. Ct.
1989)).
82. Id. (citing Spurgeon v. Julius Blum, Inc., 816 F. Supp. 1317 (C.D. Ill. 1993); Wie-
demann v. Indus. Erectors Inc., 483 N.E.2d 990 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985)).
83. Id. at 776.
84. Id.
85. 590 N.W.2d 525 (Iowa 1999).
86. Id. at 528.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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the tire with an air hose after the bead blaster seals the tire on the rim
and then completing the inflation process after the tire is placed in
the safety cage.89 In the instance leading to the injury, however, the
plaintiff left an air hose attached to the tire, while still outside the
cage, as he looked for a valve core.90 Eventually, so much air entered
the tire that it ruptured before the plaintiff could put it in the cage.91
At trial, the jury awarded the plaintiff damages on his strict liability
claim. On appeal, the defendant argued the plaintiff failed to satisfy
the requirements of section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts because he did not show the manufacturer expected the tire to
reach the plaintiff without substantial change in its condition, and
that the tire did reach the plaintiff without such change.92 Goodyear
supported this claim by arguing abuse by the prior owner of the tire
and by plaintiff for over inflating the tire.93 The Iowa Supreme Court
recognized the rule that the manufacturer is not liable where
mishandlings or other alterations beyond the manufacturer’s control
render a product defective, but the court reinforced the principle that
a manufacturer will remain liable for an altered product if it is reason-
ably foreseeable that the alteration would be made.94 Accordingly, the
Iowa Supreme Court held the misuse of a tire by running it flat or
underinflated was reasonably foreseeable, and a manufacturer should
not be relieved from liability by any such misuse.95
In Small v. Pioneer Machinery, Inc.,96 the plaintiff, an experienced
logger, sued a manufacturer and seller of log skidders97 for an alleged
design defect. While working in the forest, the plaintiff’s chainsaw be-
came stuck in a tree.98 The plaintiff asked a co-worker, who was oper-
ating a log skidder, to help him free his chainsaw by pushing against
the tree with the skidder until he could remove the chainsaw. At trial,
the plaintiff testified that using a skidder to free a wedged chainsaw
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 529.
93. Id. at 530.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. 494 S.E.2d 835 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997).
97. A log skidder is a type of heavy machinery used in logging operations to pull cut
trees out of a forest in a process called “skidding,” in which the logs are transported from
the cutting site to a landing. MERRIAM-WEBSTER COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 168 (11th ed.
2003), http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/skidding (defining skidding).
98. Small, 494 S.E.2d at 838.
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was common practice on every such job.99 Concerned about where
the tree might land, the plaintiff instructed his co-worker who was op-
erating the skidder to push the log just far enough to remove his
saw.100 Plaintiff’s co-worker began pushing the tree, and the plaintiff
was able to free his chainsaw. However, just as the plaintiff began to
signal to his co-worker to stop pushing on the tree, the skidder’s mo-
tor revved up and caused the tree to fall, strike another tree, and
caused a limb to fall and injure the plaintiff.101
Alleging defective design, the plaintiff theorized that the skid-
der’s throttle stuck, causing it to surge forward out of control and
topple the tree. At trial, the defendants’ expert testified that, because
the skidder was equipped with a governor, the only way for the engine
to “rev up” would be for the operator to depress the throttle pedal.102
After the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, the defendants ap-
pealed on the grounds that the trial court erred in denying their mo-
tions for directed verdict on the theory that the skidder had been
modified and was not in the same condition as when it was deliv-
ered.103 The appellate court agreed with the defendants’ argument
that proof that the product was in the same condition as it was when it
left the hands of the defendants is essential to any products liability
claim.104 However, the court went on to reject the defendants’ appeal
and clarified that, in a products liability case, a manufacturer or seller
may still be liable, notwithstanding subsequent alteration of the prod-
uct, when the alteration could have been anticipated.105
The above cases demonstrate that, under certain circumstances,
courts will impose liability upon manufacturers for their failure to
warn against or prevent harm caused by others’ products if the follow-
ing conditions exist: (1) the manufacturer has knowledge of a specific
risk of harm from others’ products, such as specified components;
(2) the manufacturer’s product requires use of another dangerous
product or the intended use will necessarily result in injury; or (3) the
resulting harm was the result of reasonably foreseeable alterations or
modifications. However, as discussed below, courts addressing similar
99. Id. at 838, 844–45.
100. Id. at 838.
101. Id. at. 839–41.
102. Id. at 841. A governor is a device used to measure and regulate the speed of a
machine. MERRIAM-WEBSTER COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 541 (11th ed. 2003), http://www.
merriam-webster.com/dictionary/governor (defining governor).
103. Small, 494 S.E.2d at 838.
104. Id. at 844.
105. Id.
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cases and fact patterns have reached opposite results and have limited
the liability of manufacturers for harm caused by third-party manufac-
tured products.
B. Limitations on Liability
Some courts have recognized the need for limitations on theories
that attempt to impose liability for the “foreseeable use” of a product
and have refused to extend liability for harm caused by components
or affixed products outside a manufacturer’s control. These courts
rely on principles of products liability which hold that only those in
the marketing chain should bear the risk of harm, as they alone have
the ability to spread the risk and expense among users.106 For exam-
ple, in the seminal case of Powell v. Standard Brands Paint Co.,107 the
California Court of Appeal determined that a manufacturer’s duty to
warn is limited, and it is liable only for reasonably foreseeable risks
from its own products.108 In Powell, a defendant and other manufactur-
ers supplied “certain equipment and cleaning solvents” such as
“buffer[s] and/or thinner[s].”109 While the plaintiff “was stripping a
tile floor with said buffer and thinner, an explosion occurred.”110
Plaintiff brought suit against Standard Brands for failing to warn of
“the dangerous nature of lacquer thinner or of its highly flammable
characteristics.”111 The court found that Standard Brands had no such
duty to warn.112
While acknowledging plaintiff’s argument that a manufacturer
owes a foreseeable user of its product a duty to warn of risks of using
the product, the court ruled that the evidence in the case showed “the
immediate efficient cause” of plaintiff’s injuries was the explosion of a
“product manufactured” by another.113 The court held:
[I]t is clear the manufacturer’s duty is restricted to warnings based
on the characteristics of the manufacturer’s own product. [ ] Under-
standably, the law does not require a manufacturer to study and
analyze the products of others and to warn users of risks of those
products. A manufacturer’s decision to supply warnings, and the
106. Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 810 P.2d 549 (Cal. 1991).
107. 212 Cal. Rptr. 395 (Ct. App. 1985).
108. Id. at 398.
109. Id. at 395.
110. Id. (emphasis omitted). The facts revealed that the plaintiff had run out of Stan-
dard Brands lacquer thinner and was using a different manufacturer’s lacquer thinner to
finish the floor when the explosion occurred. Id. at 396.
111. Id. at 396–97.
112. Id. at 399–400.
113. Id. at 397.
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nature of any warnings, are therefore necessarily based upon and
tailored to the risks of use of the manufacturer’s own product.
Thus, even where the manufacturer erroneously omits warnings,
the most the manufacturer could reasonably foresee is that con-
sumers might be subject to the risks of the manufacturer’s own
product, since those are the only risks he is required to know.114
The Court of Appeal reaffirmed this holding in Garman v. Magic
Chef, Inc.115 In Garman, one of the appliances in plaintiffs’ motor
home was a stove manufactured by Magic Chef.116 Faulty tubing at-
tached to the motor home’s propane tank resulted in a propane gas
leak.117 The flame on the stove, when lit by plaintiff, provided a source
of ignition for the leaking gas.118 A deadly explosion and fire ensued.
Plaintiffs sued Magic Chef alleging “the instructions provided by de-
fendant Magic Chef for the operation of the gas range were inade-
quate in that they did not warn the stove user to check inside the
motor home for gas leaks before lighting the pilot and making use of
the stove.”119
The Court of Appeal noted that, while the gas “was ignited by the
stove’s flame. There was no physical defect in the stove. It was working
properly.”120 The appellate court held that “the stove manufacturer
had [no] duty to warn that a lighted but properly operating stove
might ignite gas leaking from some other place.”121 The court ex-
plained that “[i]t was not any unreasonably dangerous condition or
feature of [Magic Chef’s] product which caused the injury. To say that
the absence of a warning to check for gas leaks in other products makes the stove
defective is semantic nonsense.”122 The court elaborated:
The use of any product can be said to involve some risk because of
the circumstances surrounding even its normal use. Nonetheless,
the makers of such products are not liable under any theory, for
merely failing to warn of injury which may befall a person who uses
that product in an unsafe place or in conjunction with another
product which because of a defect or improper use is itself
unsafe.123
Noting that it was the tubing that was defective, and not the stove, the
court unequivocally stated that Magic Chef “was under no duty to
114. Id. at 398 (citations omitted).
115. 173 Cal. Rptr. 20 (Ct. App. 1981).
116. Id. at 21.
117. Id. 21–22.
118. Id. at 22.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. (emphasis added).
123. Id. at 23.
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warn of the possible defect in the product of another and is not liable
for failure to do so.”124
Other jurisdictions have also refrained from expanding on the
principles of a manufacturer’s duty to warn when the manufacturer is
only responsible for contributing a component of the overall product.
In Wenrick v. Schloemann-Siemag, A.G.,125 the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court upheld a lower court’s decision in favor of a defendant switch
manufacturer, finding it did not have a duty to warn of the dangers
associated with the placement of its switch which activated a hydraulic
loader that crushed the plaintiff’s husband.126 Plaintiff initially settled
with the manufacturer of the hydraulic loader, and then sued the
manufacturer of the switch—presumably to obtain additional recov-
ery.127 Ultimately, the court concluded that no duty to warn existed
because the switch manufacturer did not have control over the place-
ment of the switch and had no knowledge as to the placement of the
switch.128
In Cipollone v. Yale Industrial Products, Inc.,129 the plaintiff was in-
jured while working on a loading dock at a FedEx facility.130 Defen-
dant Yale had manufactured and delivered to FedEx a customized
dock lift that was an integral part of FedEx’s material-handling sys-
tem.131 The dock lift was installed at the FedEx facility by another de-
fendant, Davco Corporation, which was responsible for integrating
Yale’s lift into the overall material handling system.132 The lift was in-
stalled adjacent to a catwalk, which created a hazardous “pinch point”
where something (or someone) could get caught and injured.133 The
pinch point caught the plaintiff’s arm while he was working on the
dock, severing part of his hand.134 In his lawsuit, the plaintiff claimed
that Yale failed to warn him of this shearing hazard potentially created
by their lift.135
The First Circuit rejected the plaintiff’s theory of liability against
Yale, stating:
124. Id.
125. 564 A.2d 1244 (Pa. 1989).
126. Id. at 1248.
127. Id. at 1246.
128. Id. at 1247–48.
129. 202 F.3d 376 (1st Cir. 2000) (applying Massachusetts law).
130. Id. at 377.
131. Id. at 378.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 378 n.2.
134. Id. at 378.
135. Id. at 379.
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When a component of an integrated product is not itself defective,
the maker of the component is not liable for injury that results
from a defect in the integrated product. “If the component is not
itself defective, it would be unjust and inefficient to impose liability
solely on the ground that the manufacturer of the integrated prod-
uct utilizes the component in a manner that renders the integrated
product defective.” Therefore, the manufacturer of a component is
liable only if the defect existed in the manufacturer’s component
itself.136
The court continued: “In this case, Yale designed to FedEx’s specifica-
tions a lift, which FedEx later integrated into a larger package-han-
dling system.”137 The court determined there could be no liability
against Yale “[b]ecause there is no evidence that Yale’s lift itself was
defective when Yale delivered it to FedEx and because Yale’s product
is merely a component of FedEx’s larger package-handling system,
summary judgment for Yale was proper.”138
Similarly, in Toth v. Economy Forms Corp.,139 the plaintiff’s dece-
dent was killed when he stepped on a wooden plank supported by
scaffolding, and the plank broke away, causing him to fall to his
death.140 The scaffolding was attached to concrete-forming equip-
ment which Economy Forms had supplied, while another company
supplied the wooden plank.141 The plaintiff tried to hold Economy
Forms liable for “fail[ure] to instruct as to [the scaffolding’s] proper
use or warn of inherent dangers associated with its use.”142 The court
held that “Pennsylvania law [did] not permit such a result[,]”143 and
denied the plaintiff recovery against Economy Forms.144 The court
said that “[i]n order for liability to attach in a products liability action
such as this, the plaintiff must show the injuries suffered were caused
by a product of the particular manufacturer or supplier.”145 The court
further found that “[t]here is no legal authority supporting [plain-
tiff’s] attempt to hold a supplier liable in strict liability for a product it
does not even supply.”146
136. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 5 (1998)) (ci-
tations omitted).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. 571 A.2d 420 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
140. Id. at 421.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 423
143. Id.
144. Id. at 422.
145. Id. (citing Eckenrod v. GAF Corp., 544 A.2d 50, 52 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988)).
146. Id. at 422.
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In Walton v. Harnischfeger,147 a nylon strap rigged to carry a load
of tin attached to a crane designed by the defendant broke, causing
the load to fall on and injure the plaintiff.148 The plaintiff alleged the
defendant had a duty to warn or provide instruction regarding the
nylon strap, even though he acknowledged the defendant did not
manufacture, distribute, sell, or otherwise place the nylon strap into
the stream of commerce.149 After noting that rigging is a “complex
art” outside the scope of Harnischfeger’s business and expertise, the
court declared that “[t]o require [Harnischfeger] to warn of all rig-
ging dangers would be unfair and unrealistic.”150 Thus, under Texas
law, a manufacturer that did not manufacture, distribute, sell, or oth-
erwise place replacement parts into the stream of commerce would
not be obligated to warn of all the dangers associated with those re-
placement parts.
A series of tire explosion cases also addressed limitations on a
manufacturer’s duty to prevent harm caused by another’s product. In
Baughman v. General Motors Corp.,151 the Fourth Circuit considered the
case of a tire mechanic who was injured while changing a tire on a
1979 General Motors (“GM”) truck. The facts established that GM
only placed CR-3 model wheels on its trucks.152 The tire on this partic-
ular truck was mounted on a CR-2 multi-piece wheel—a model that
was not marketed by GM but had an identical locking mechanism to
the CR-3 wheel and was a similar type of wheel.153 After removing the
wheel from the truck, and then changing and re-inflating the tire, the
plaintiff was remounting the wheel when it suddenly exploded.154
Plaintiff sued GM claiming it owed a duty to warn that the wheel could
explode.155
Applying section 402A, the Fourth Circuit rejected plaintiff’s the-
ory that GM had a duty to warn about the dangers of a product that
GM did not design, manufacture, or place into the stream of com-
merce, and provided the following analysis:
Baughman’s position would require a manufacturer to test all pos-
sible replacement parts made by any manufacturer to determine
their safety and to warn against the use of certain replacement
147. 796 S.W.2d 225 (1990).
148. Id. at 226.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 227–28.
151. 780 F.2d 1131 (4th Cir. 1986).
152. Id. at 1132.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
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parts. If the law were to impose such a duty, the burden upon a
manufacturer would be excessive. While a manufacturer can be
fairly charged with testing and warning of dangers associated with
components it decides to incorporate into its own product, it can-
not be charged with testing and warning against any of a myriad of
replacement parts supplied by any number of manufacturers. The
duty to warn must properly fall upon the manufacturer of the re-
placement component part.156
Similarly, in Reynolds v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc.,157 the Eleventh
Circuit confronted a scenario where the plaintiff’s decedent was killed
while changing and re-mounting a Goodyear brand tire and Firestone
rim assembly on a heavy equipment vehicle.158 The rim failed, causing
an explosive separation between the tire and the rim, which killed the
decedent.159 Plaintiff claimed that Goodyear “negligently and wan-
tonly placed its tire on the market and failed to warn [decedent] of
the imminent dangers involved in using its tires with a multi-piece
rim.”160 The court described as “well-settled state law” the rule that
Goodyear could not be held liable “for injuries caused by a product it
did not manufacture, sell, or otherwise place in the stream of com-
merce.”161 Thus, Alabama law, as interpreted by the Eleventh Circuit,
rejects the theory that a manufacturer has a duty to warn about third-
party manufactured or affixed parts.
In Rastelli v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,162 another “exploding
tire” case, plaintiff’s decedent was killed while inflating a truck tire
(manufactured by Goodyear) when the multi-piece tire rim (not man-
ufactured by Goodyear) “separated explosively” and struck him in the
head.163 The issue before the court was whether Goodyear had “a duty
to warn against its nondefective tire being used with an allegedly de-
fective tire rim manufactured by others.”164 Plaintiff alleged that the
“Goodyear tire was made for installation on a multipiece rim, that
Goodyear was aware of the inherent dangers of using its tires in con-
junction with such rims and, thus, that Goodyear had a duty to warn
of the dangers resulting from such an intended use of its tires.”165
Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that Goodyear was liable “based only
156. Id. at 1133.
157. 989 F.2d 465 (11th Cir. 1993) (applying Alabama law).
158. Id. at 467.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 468.
161. Id. at 472.
162. 591 N.E.2d 222 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1992).
163. Id. at 223.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 225.
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on the fact that the particular Goodyear tire could be used with mul-
tipiece rims which had their own alleged inherent defects.”166 Though
the court acknowledged that “a manufacturer has a duty to warn
against latent dangers resulting from foreseeable uses of its products
of which it knew or should have known,” it “decline[d] to hold that
one manufacturer has a duty to warn about another manufacturer’s
product when the first manufacturer produces a sound product which
is compatible for use with a defective product of the other manufac-
turer.”167 The court justified its reasoning by noting that “Goodyear
had no control over the production of the subject multi-piece rim,
had no role in placing that rim in the stream of commerce, and de-
rived no benefit from its sale.”168 Importantly, the court pointed out
that “Plaintiff does not dispute that if Goodyear’s tire had been used
with a sound rim, no accident would have occurred.”169
Injuries resulting from chemical exposures or reactions have led
courts to further explore and set limitations on the liability of manu-
facturers for the product of another. For example, in Brown v. Drake-
Willock International Ltd.,170 plaintiff worked as a dialysis technician in
a hospital where “she was required to use a formaldehyde solution to
clean the dialysis machines” daily.171 She claimed serious injuries as a
result of exposure to formaldehyde.172 Plaintiff argued the defendant
manufacturer of the dialysis machine had a duty to warn her about
the dangers associated with formaldehyde exposure.173 The Michigan
Court of Appeals declined to find a duty to warn on the part of the
166. Id.
167. Id. at 225–26 (citing Cover v. Cohen, 461 N.E.2d 864, 871 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1984);
Alfieri v. Cabot Corp., 235 N.Y.S.2d 753, 759 (N.Y. App. Div. 1962)).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 226. Spencer v. Ford Motor Co., 367 N.W.2d 393 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985) is an-
other exploding tire case with facts virtually identical to Baugman and Reynolds. Though
defendant Ford did not design or manufacture the wheel rim which ultimately failed,
plaintiff argued that Ford failed to warn of the danger of these multi-piece wheel rims. Id.
at 395. Noting that a plaintiff “must trace [the] defect into the hands of the defendant,”
the court ultimately resolved the case on the issue of causation, finding a lack of causal
connection between Ford’s “negligence or product defect and the plaintiff’s injury.” Id. at
396 (citations omitted). However, as to the element of duty, the court stated that:
Although we do not discuss whether or not Ford had a duty to warn of the danger
of another manufacturer’s replacement component, but disposed of plaintiff’s
claim on the lack of a causal connection, we do not imply that we accept plain-
tiff’s argument that Ford had such a duty to warn.
Id. at 396 n.2.
170. 530 N.W.2d 510 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995).
171. Id. at 512.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 514.
\\server05\productn\S\SAN\44-1\SAN102.txt unknown Seq: 22  2-OCT-09 11:17
54 UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44
defendant even though the plaintiff alleged the defendant manufac-
turer recommended the use of formaldehyde to clean its dialysis ma-
chine.174 The court found:
In this case, [defendants] did not supply the formaldehyde
that allegedly caused plaintiff’s injury. Furthermore, formaldehyde
[is] not related directly to the safe operation of defendants’ dialysis
machines. Plaintiff did not allege that the machines themselves
were dangerous or defective; rather, plaintiff alleged that her use
of formaldehyde caused her injuries.
In granting the summary disposition, the trial court deter-
mined that defendant dialysis machine manufacturers owed no
duty to warn because they merely supplied the dialysis machines
cleaned by plaintiff. The court held that defendant manufactur-
ers did not have a duty to provide warnings for dangerous condi-
tions present in other products. We agree. The law does not
impose upon manufacturers a duty to warn of the hazards of using
products manufactured by someone else. [ ] Because plaintiff did
not allege that the dialysis machines themselves were dangerous or
defective, she cannot assert that defendant manufacturers had a
duty to warn of the dangers of formaldehyde.175
As demonstrated above, courts have long adjudicated claims in
favor of a manufacturer that produces a sound product, which is then
used with another manufacturer’s defective product. Such a manufac-
turer has no control over the production of the third-party affixed or
replacement part, plays no role in placing the third-party product in
the stream of commerce, and derives no benefit from its sale. Notwith-
standing otherwise expansive notions of foreseeability that result in
liability for virtually any use of a product, these courts have refined the
contours of liability by focusing on facts beyond the control of the
manufacturer and have held a manufacturer is not responsible in such
circumstances. Thus, the manufacturer in these cases has no duty to
warn about the hazards of third-party affixed or replacement parts
used with its products.
III. Courts in the West Draw Bright-Line Rules
Today’s products liability doctrine generally provides that manu-
facturers, retailers, and others, including successor corporations, will
be liable in tort for injuries caused by a defective product for which
they were in the marketing chain and exercised some measure of con-
trol in bringing the product to the market.176 Yet, due to the flexibility
174. Id. at 514–15.
175. Id. (citations omitted).
176. Peterson v. Superior Court, 899 P.2d 905 (Cal. 1995); see Ray v. Alad Corp., 560
P.2d 3, 8 (Cal. 1977).
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of tort law, courts have also found limitations to liability when apply-
ing tests of duty and foreseeability to manufacturers for harm caused
by replacement and affixed parts manufactured and distributed by
others. The inconsistent results demonstrate the need for a uniform
bright-line rule that restores predictability and fairness to the victims
and industry—especially in the context of asbestos litigation. Courts
have determined that liability should attach, if at all, to the following
defendants: (1) those who derive financial benefit from the sale of the
injury-causing product; (2) those whose conduct was a necessary fac-
tor in bringing the product to market; and (3) those who have control
over, or a substantial opportunity to influence through purchasing
power, the manufacture and distribution of the injury-producing
product.177 Because those outside the marketing chain have no op-
portunity to inspect and evaluate the safety of the product, failure to
apply a bright-line test can lead to “commercial as well as legal night-
mares” in product distribution.178
To clarify this area of law, courts addressing asbestos claims and
facing the questions of whether a manufacturer has a duty to warn of
hazards associated with third-party replacement or connected parts
should look to the bright-line standards recently set by Washington179
and California,180 and find that those outside the marketing chain
177. Taylor v. Elliott Turbomachinery Co., 90 Cal. Rptr. 3d 414, 422 (Ct. App. 2009).
178. Id. at 423; see Peterson, 899 P.2d 905.
179. See Simonetta v. Viad Corp., 197 P.3d 127 (Wash. 2008); Braaten v. Saberhagen
Holdings, 198 P.3d 493 (Wash. 2008).
180. See Taylor, 90 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 423; see also Merrill v. Leslie Controls, Inc., No.
B200006, 2009 WL 3051534 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 25, 2009) (holding defendant value manu-
facturer not strictly liable for failure to warn or design defect for asbestos-containing prod-
ucts that it did not manufacture, supply, or place in the chain of distribution). However,
another Division of the Second District of the California Court of Appeal recently reached
a different conclusion, finding for defendant manufacturers of pumps and valves which
incorporated the use of asbestos-containing components and required replacement parts
were no different from the original parts, and reversed an order nonsuit issued before
Taylor. See O’Neil v. Crane Co., No. B208225, 2009 WL 2973657 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 18,
2009) (“Taylor was wrongly decided.”). There are also two factually similar cases now pend-
ing in the Second District of the California Courts of Appeal: Wm. Powell Co. v. Walton, No.
B208214 (Cal. Ct. App. filed Apr. 9, 2009); Hall v. Warren Pumps LLC, No. B208275 (Cal.
Ct. App. filed Apr. 10, 2009). Both cases were decided in the trial court before the Taylor
opinion was published. In Powell, the lower court rejected the defendants’ argument that
California does not recognize a duty to warn with respect to products that the defendants
did not make or supply. In Hall, the trial court ruled that a defendant could not be liable
for the combined use of a defendant’s products with products made by another company,
and that the plaintiff had not proved exposure to any asbestos-containing product origi-
nally supplied by defendants.
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bear no liability for asbestos-containing replacement or affixed
parts.181
A. Companion Cases from Washington State
On December 11, 2008, the Washington Supreme Court issued
simultaneous opinions in Simonetta v. Viad Corp.182 and Braaten v.
Saberhagen Holdings.183 These cases flatly rejected efforts to expand the
“duty to warn” theory, finding that defendants cannot be held liable
for failing to warn of the hazards of another manufacturer’s product
that is applied to or incorporated into the defendants’ products.184
In Simonetta, a former machinist’s mate filed suit against Viad
Corporation for both negligence and strict liability based on exposure
to asbestos during Simonetta’s work on machinery while serving
aboard a United States Navy ship.185 The alleged exposure to asbestos
occurred when the plaintiff opened a small door on an evaporator
manufactured by Viad that was used to convert seawater into fresh
water.186 The plaintiff had to open the door to the evaporator in or-
der to examine it and make necessary repairs to some of its internal
mechanisms.187 In order to open the evaporator, plaintiff was re-
quired to remove asbestos-containing block insulation, as well as as-
bestos-containing mud and asbestos cloth that was added to the
machine by the Navy after its installation.188 Viad did not manufac-
181. To date, no published opinion has ruled otherwise or provided a reasoned analy-
sis for the opposite conclusion. See, e.g., Feidt v. Owens Corning Fiberglas Corp., 153 F.3d
124, 127 (3d Cir. 1998) (noting that the “sole potentially viable claim” against the defendant
was based on the defendant’s failure to warn persons such as the plaintiff of the dangers of
contact with asbestos-laden thermal insulation used with the turbines manufactured by the
defendant); Chicano v. Gen. Elec. Co., No. Civ.A. 03-5126, 2004 WL 2250990, *10 (E.D. Pa.
Oct. 5, 2004) (applying Pennsylvania’s component manufacturer liability test, the district
court found a triable issue of fact as to whether the manufacturer of a turbine bore liability
for exposure to asbestos-containing insulation allegedly integrated with the turbine by
others into a final product); Berkowitz v. A.C. and S., Inc., 733 N.Y.S.2d 410, 412 (N.Y.A.D.
2001) (undeveloped analysis affirming denial of summary judgment because it did not
necessarily appear that a pump manufacturer “had no duty to warn concerning the dan-
gers of asbestos that it neither manufactured nor installed on its pumps,” but were appar-
ently installed pursuant to government specifications). O’Neil disagrees with Taylor and has
been certified for publication, but the decision is not yet final at the time of this writing.
O’Neil, 2009 WL 2973657, at *1.
182. 197 P.3d 127 (Wash. 2008).
183. 198 P.3d 493 (Wash. 2008).
184. Simonetta, 197 P.3d at 138; Braaten, 198 P.3d at 504.
185. Simonetta, 197 P.3d at 130.
186. Id. at 129–30.
187. Id.
188. Id.
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ture, supply, or specify the use of any of these asbestos-containing
products.189
The plaintiff claimed “that Viad breached its duty to warn him of
the risks from the intended use of the evaporator, which included rou-
tine and necessary maintenance.”190 The plaintiff argued that the
product itself did not need to inflict harm “in order for a duty to warn
to arise.”191 Rather, it was enough that the harm was caused by the use
of product “in the manner for which it is intended and by a person for
whose use it is supplied.”192 The plaintiff contended that the para-
mount question before the court was “whether the manufacturer of a
potentially dangerous product must warn of the hazards associated
with the product’s use,” which in this case would include the “risks
arising from the expected use of the evaporator in conjunction with
asbestos insulation.”193
In response, Viad argued that no duty to warn should be imposed
for dangers of asbestos since it did not manufacture, supply, or sell
any of the harmful asbestos-containing insulation. The Court of Ap-
peals held that the danger of asbestos exposure was inherent in the
use of the evaporator because it was built with the knowledge that
insulation was required for operation, and that it would be disturbed
during the course of maintenance.194 The Supreme Court of Washing-
ton disagreed. It held that under section 388 of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts, the analysis of the duty to warn of the hazards of a
product should be limited to those in the chain of distribution of the
product—that is, manufacturers, suppliers, or sellers.195 The court
concluded that Viad had no duty to warn as a matter of law because it
189. Id. at 132.
190. Id. at 131.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (1965)). Section 388 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts states:
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for another to use
is subject to liability to those whom the supplier should expect to use the chattel
with the consent of the other or to be endangered by its probable use, for physi-
cal harm caused by the use of the chattel in the manner for which and by a
person for whose use it is supplied, if the supplier: (a) knows or has reason to
know that the chattel is or is likely to be dangerous for the use for which it is
supplied, and (b) has no reason to believe that those for whose use the chattel is
supplied will realize its dangerous condition, and (c) fails to exercise reasonable
care to inform them of its dangerous condition or of the facts which make it likely
to be dangerous.
194. Id. at 130.
195. Id. at 134.
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did not manufacture, sell, or supply the asbestos insulation that
harmed the plaintiff.196
The plaintiff also asserted a strict liability claim based on the ar-
gument that the proper use of the evaporator necessarily involved the
use of asbestos insulation, which resulted in his exposure to asbestos
and, thus, the evaporator itself was unreasonably dangerous without
warnings.197 The Supreme Court of Washington disagreed, holding
that strict liability should not attach under section 402A of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts because Viad did not sell an unreasonably
dangerous product.198 The court noted that Viad sold the evaporator
without insulation, and that it did not manufacture, sell, or select the
asbestos insulation.199 The court concluded that, since Viad was not in
the chain of distribution of the dangerous product, Viad bore no duty
to warn under negligence or strict liability theories.200
The companion case of Braaten v. Saberhagen Holdings201 involved
a lawsuit filed by a former pipe-fitter against five manufacturers of va-
rious pumps, valves, and turbines because of their alleged failure to
warn about the dangers of asbestos inhalation involved with using
their products.202 All five manufacturers either sold products (valves,
pumps, or turbines) containing asbestos gaskets and packing, or were
aware that asbestos insulation was regularly used in and around their
machines when they were installed.203 The trial court granted sum-
mary judgment in favor of all five manufacturers, ruling they had no
duty to warn about asbestos products manufactured and installed by
others.204 The Supreme Court of Washington applied the same ratio-
nale used in its Simonetta opinion and concluded that a manufacturer
has no duty under common law products liability or negligence princi-
ples to warn of the dangers of exposure to asbestos in products it did
not manufacture and for which the manufacturer was not in the chain
of distribution.205 The court found it significant that defendants did
not manufacture or sell the asbestos-containing replacement packing
and gaskets and were not in the chain of distribution of those prod-
196. Id.
197. Id. at 134–35.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 138.
201. 198 P.3d 493 (Wash. 2008).
202. Id. at 495.
203. Id. at 495–98.
204. Id. at 496.
205. Id. at 503–04.
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ucts.206 As a result, the court held that plaintiff’s claims based on the
failure to warn of the danger of exposure to asbestos in insulation
applied to pumps and valves and in replacement packing and gaskets
installed in or connected to the pumps and valves failed as a matter of
law.207 With the holdings in Braaten and Simonetta, the Supreme Court
of Washington astutely observed the basis for the bright-line rule and
rejected component maker liability for failure to warn of asbestos-re-
lated hazards made by others on the basis of foreseeability of harm.208
B. California’s Bright-Line Standard
As discussed above, California has long recognized limitations to
a manufacturer’s duty to warn and generally has only extended liabil-
ity to reasonably foreseeable risks arising from a manufacturer’s own
products. Recently, this approach has been further refined, in line with
the holdings in Braaten and Simonetta, to hold that component part
manufacturers have no duty to warn, under either a strict liability or
negligence theory, for products manufactured or supplied by others.
The California Court of Appeal in Taylor v. Elliott Turbomachinery
Co.,209 held that a manufacturer is not liable for replacement and af-
fixed parts.210 In Taylor, the five defendants that were the subject of
the appeal supplied various pieces of equipment, including pumps,
valves, and de-aerating feed tanks, to the United States Navy for use in
the propulsion system of the USS Hornet, a 1943 commissioned steam-
driven aircraft carrier.211 When first delivered to the Navy, the equip-
ment incorporated asbestos-containing components—gaskets, pack-
ing, and sometimes insulation—that were made by manufacturers
other than the five defendants.212 According to plaintiffs’ naval ex-
206. Id. at 504.
207. Id.
208. The Washington State Court of Appeals recently applied the holdings from
Braaten and Simonetta in Anderson v. Asbestos Corp., No. 60271-3-I, 2009 WL 2032332 (Wash.
Ct. App. July 13, 2009). In Anderson, the plaintiff argued that the trial court incorrectly
excluded evidence regarding its theory that the defendant engine manufacturer had a duty
to warn about asbestos insulation used with engines it manufactured. Following the Braaten
and Simonetta decisions, the Court of Appeals reversed its prior finding that Caterpillar had
a duty to warn. The Court held that “there is no duty under common law products liability
or negligence principles to warn of the danger of exposure to asbestos in other manufac-
turers’ products.” Id. at *2 (citation omitted). The Court also recognized that “[i]t makes
no difference whether the manufacturer knew its products would be used in conjunction
with asbestos insulation.” Id. (citation omitted).
209. 90 Cal. Rptr. 3d 414 (Ct. App. 2009).
210. Id. at 425–26.
211. Id. at 418.
212. Id. at 425.
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pert, by the time Taylor served on the USS Hornet in the 1960s, the
original asbestos-containing components of the five defendants’
equipment would have been removed.213 The principle issues on ap-
peal were whether the five defendants could be liable on a failure to
warn or negligence theory with respect to the replacement gaskets or
the addition of insulation. Plaintiffs primarily argued that each defen-
dant was responsible for the foreseeable uses of its products, including
any foreseeable changes.214
The Court of Appeal ruled in favor of the defendants on the fail-
ure to warn issue for three related reasons. First, under California law,
the duty to warn is limited to entities in the chain of distribution of
the defective product, and it was not the defendants’ products that
caused Taylor’s injuries.215 Second, a manufacturer in California has
no duty to warn of defects in the products of others used in conjunc-
tion with the manufacturer’s product, except where the manufac-
turer’s product itself causes or creates the risk of harm.216 Third, the
component parts doctrine—that a manufacturer or supplier of a non-
defective component has no liability when it builds a product to a
customer’s specifications, so long as it is not substantially involved in
the integration of the components into the final product—shielded
the defendants from liability.217
As to the plaintiffs’ negligence claim, the Court of Appeal ruled
that the defendants owed the plaintiffs no duty of care. The plaintiffs
argued that it was foreseeable that asbestos insulation, gaskets, and
packing would be used with the defendants’ equipment.218 The appel-
late court, however, concluded that the harm to Taylor—twenty years
after the sale of the manufacturers’ products—was of questionable
foreseeability.219 The court then ruled that policy considerations
weighed against recognizing a duty of care owed by the five defend-
ants for the following reasons: (1) the connection between the de-
fendants’ conduct and Taylor’s injury caused by other manufacturers’
products twenty years later was too remote; (2) little blame could be
attributed to the conduct of the manufacturer defendants who did not
supply the asbestos-containing products that the plaintiff actually en-
countered; (3) the policy of preventing future harm would not be
213. Id. at 419–20.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 425.
216. Id. at 425–26.
217. Id. at 439.
218. Id. at 437.
219. Id. at 431.
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served; (4) a duty under these circumstances would impose significant
burdens on the defendants; and (5) the defendants’ conduct provid-
ing parts essential to powering an aircraft carrier in World War II was
of high social utility.220
The Court of Appeal in Taylor did not address the design defect
theory of products liability. However, the court’s analysis with respect
to the failure to warn and negligence theories should apply with equal
force to a design defect claim. In essence, like the bright-line rule es-
tablished in Washington, the Taylor opinion supports the application
of the same bright-line rule in California under any products liability
theory; those manufacturers outside the marketing chain of injury-
producing, asbestos-containing replacement or affixed parts bear no
liability as a matter of law.
IV. Implications and Conclusion
Harm caused by replacement and affixed parts presents vexing
problems, especially in the context of asbestos litigation where the
manufacturers and distributors of those products are either insolvent
or not readily identifiable. Nonetheless, the absence of blameworthy
solvent defendants does not justify the imposition of expanded theo-
ries of liability to those parties who could not prevent the harm. From
both compensation and deterrence perspectives, the issue is not
whether asbestos victims should receive compensation from some en-
tity, but rather which entity can fairly be called upon to shoulder the
financial burden.
Manufacturers of equipment derive no financial benefit from the
sale of replacement or affixed parts manufactured by others, nor do
they have the financial leverage to influence the design of those parts.
As the replacement and affixed parts manufacturers have their own
motives for the design and manufacture of their products, the equip-
ment manufacturers are not a necessary factor in bringing the re-
placement or affixed products to market. Thus, in requiring
companies that played no more than a relatively small or attenuated
“role in exposing workers to asbestos to bear substantial costs of com-
pensating for asbestos injuries not only raises fundamental questions
of fairness but undercuts the deterrence objectives of the tort sys-
tem.”221 Further, “[i]f business [entities] believe that tort outcomes
220. Id. at 437–40.
221. CARROLL ET AL., supra note 7, at 129. R
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have little to do with their own behavior, then there is no reason for
them to shape their behavior so as to minimize tort exposure.”222
The recent decisions from Washington and California correctly
address these problems head on. These opinions show how to restore
fairness and predictability to products liability law and the court sys-
tem by curtailing the commercial and legal nightmares in product dis-
tribution engendered by an otherwise expansive and novel
application of tort law. By refusing to extend a manufacturer’s liability
for defective or harmful third-party manufactured replacement or af-
fixed parts, and instead applying a bright-line rule which requires a
manufacturer to be in the chain of distribution of a product that
caused the harm before any liability attaches, other jurisdictions can
and should follow the changing tide from the West to ensure a fairer
and functional tort law system.
222. Id.
